Life cycle greenhouse gas emissions from power generation in China's provinces in 2020 by Li, Xin et al.
   
 
 
 
  
1 
 
 
Life cycle green-house gas emissions from power generation in 
China’s provinces in 2020 
 
Xin Lia,b,∗ Konstantinos J. Chalvatzisa,b Dimitrios Pappasa,b 
aNorwich Business School, University of East Anglia, Norwich, NR4 7TJ, UK 
bTyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, University of East Anglia, Norwich, NR4 7TJ, UK  
Abstract 
Carbon intensity of power generation is an important indicator to show the direct 
competitiveness of electricity against the combustion of fossil fuels. In this study, we estimate 
the carbon intensities of power generation in China’s provinces. Most provinces are likely to 
have a carbon intensity per unit of power generation between 500 and 700 grams CO2/kWh in 
2020, which justifies the progress of electrification from the power generation perspective. 
With the growing share of low carbon power generation, most provinces show trends of decline 
in carbon intensity between 2015 and 2020. However, some provinces are expected to see 
increase in carbon intensity due to increasing share of coal power generation in their power 
mixes. Coal is still a major growth contributor in most provinces, despite significant growths 
of low carbon energy sources. Furthermore, renewable energy sources can help reduce the 
carbon intensity of power generation, but a better coordination among provinces is required, 
alongside with strong government support and direction.  
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1. Introduction1 
Low carbon electricity technologies have become more readily available from financial, 
technical and institutional perspectives. It has made electrification of the energy system a 
popular choice in the process of decarbonisation. Fossil fuels used for heating purposes and in 
transportation system can be replaced by electricity that is produced by renewables and other 
low carbon technologies, which in turn reduce CO2 emissions, changing the fuel mix without 
compromising security of supply [1-3]. Such transition would require electricity generation to 
be at least carbon emission competitive comparing to the conventional technologies, therefore 
the benefits of electrification can be justified.  
 
In a previous study, Kennedy et al. [4] discuss the low-carbon infrastructure strategies for 
global cities. The authors argue that electrification of the transportation system can become 
carbon competitive once carbon intensity of power generation drops to 600 tonnes of CO2 
equivalent (CO2-e) per gigawatt hour (or 600 grams CO2-e per kilowatt-hour). In a following 
study, Kennedy [5] addresses the significance of achieving a short-term target of below 600 
g/kWh by 2020, which is essential to achieve the 2oC emission target in the longer term. 
Certainly, it is a short-term goal but it can be considered as a first step towards more ambitious 
targets of reducing CO2 emissions per unit of electricity by 90% by 2050, as proposed by the 
IEA [6]. 
 
Since 1990, global average carbon intensity of electricity generation had been relatively stable 
varying between 506 and 546 grams CO2 per kWh (see Figure 1). However, there have been 
large variations in carbon intensity of power generation in different countries, influenced by a 
range of factors. Resource endowments and investment in these resources can affect the 
selection of power generation technology. Countries with significant hydropower potential can 
produce electricity of lower carbon intensity (such as Canada); by contrast, countries that have 
large fossil fuel reserves (such as oil in Saudi Arabia and coal in Australia) tend to produce 
electricity of higher carbon intensity. Equally, regions that face lack of availability of energy 
resources may choose to import forms of energy that are easily accessible but environmentally 
and financially damaging. At the same time, relevant government policies on energy and 
climate usually lead to a transition towards decarbonisation 2 . For example, the UK has 
introduced a carbon floor price [7], which is much higher than the price of EU ETS emission 
allowances. It has resulted in higher marginal costs for coal-fired stations than natural gas; 
therefore competitiveness loss. A significant decline in carbon intensity of power generation 
has happened in the UK. The country also introduced incentives to promote the conversion of 
existing coal-fired power plant to biomass (such as the case of Drax power station). 
Furthermore, demand growth can also affect technology selection. For countries with lower 
                                                 
 
1 The short version of the paper was presented at ICAE2017, Aug 21-24, Cardiff, UK. This paper is a substantial 
extension of the short version of the conference paper. 
2 The revival of coal mining industry in the US and its associated environmental impacts is regarded as a special 
case. 
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level of demand growth, building low-carbon intensive power technologies is capable to satisfy 
the demand. It is more convincing to phase out carbon intensive power plants and replace them 
with renewables when there is no demand growth pressure. 
 
 
Figure 1: Carbon intensity of electricity generation in selected countries and at global average level 
Source: [8] 
 
As can be seen from Figure 1, China has shown a fast decline in carbon intensity of power 
generation, which had dropped to 657 CO2 g/kWh in 2015 from 912 CO2 g/kWh in 1990 [8]. 
Further reduction on carbon intensity per unit of power generation can be beneficial to China, 
since electrification has become an important component in China’s energy transition. Fossil 
fuel combustion for heating, transportation and other purposes are not sustainable and need to 
be replaced with other technologies. There is no easy alternative within those areas, which 
makes electrification a popular choice [9, 10]. Recent policies on China’s electricity industry 
and its associated emission intensity has shown ambitious targets. For example, policy on 
controlling greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the 13th Five-Year period has stated a target of 
electricity supply from major power generators to reach 550 g/kWh [11]. However, historical 
data and recent trends in power supply emissions showed that even if a regional industrial shift 
occurs [12], the target may have overestimated the capability of achieving lower emission 
levels from China’s power generation.   
 
Furthermore, even though there are benefits in policy implementation through a central 
government [13] or a government controlled system [14] for a country as large as China, it is 
important to understand the carbon intensity in power generation at sub-national level. Power 
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generation in China’s provinces shows a large variation in terms of both volume and fuel mix. 
In 2015, for example, Shandong was the largest electricity-producing province. Its total power 
generation reached 461.9 TWh, with fossil fuels and wind power accounted for 97.6% and 
2.1% of power supply respectively (the rest 0.3% was contributed equally by hydropower and 
solar power). Tibet is the smallest electricity-producing province with total power generation 
of 3.9 TWh. Hydropower dominated the supply mix, which accounted for 88.1% of the total 
production. The share of solar power was 6.2%, which was ahead of all non-hydro energy 
sources (2.8%) and fossil fuels (2.6%). Moreover, resource endowments encourage the growth 
of renewable energy sources in some provinces [15]. By the end of 2015, Inner Mongolia had 
larger wind power capacity (24 GW) than Spain which at 23 GW has the fifth largest wind 
capacity in the world. At the same time, five western and central provinces including Sichuan, 
Yunnan, Hubei, Guizhou and Guangxi accounted for over 70% of the total hydropower 
generation in China.  
 
Understanding the future power mix and its emission intensity can be important to justify the 
transition towards electrification. This study estimates the carbon intensity of power generation 
by 2020 in China’s provinces. A novel approach is used to include life cycle greenhouse gas 
emissions. The structure of this paper is organized as following: in Section 2, we introduce the 
background of China’s power industry briefly with regards to the development plans during 
the thirteenth five-year period. Then, we introduce the data collection and the method to 
calculate carbon intensity in Section 3. Section 4 introduces the results of this study and Section 
5 discuss the research findings. We conclude the study in Section 6.  
 
2. China’s power industry in the thirteenth five-year period 
China’s Five-Year Plans are a series of social and economic development initiatives. The most 
well-known five-year plan is the Five-Year Plan on Social and Economic Development [16], 
which provides general guidance for economic development, sets growth targets, and proposes 
reforms at the beginning of each five-year period, with the 13th and last period being between 
2016 and 2020. Alongside the economy-wide development, a number of supplementary plans 
are delivered by different government agencies, following the general guidance from the Five-
Year Plan on Social and Economic Development. 
 
Indeed, the 12th five-year period (between 2011 and 2015) has been a cornerstone in China’s 
power industry. Electricity demand growth has fallen to a record low level, particularly in 2014 
and 2015, due to the economic rebalancing towards services-based and consumption-driven 
rather than industry development paths [17]. Even in this trajectory the role of electricity 
utilities in innovating for their end-users is paramount [18]. Average annual growth rate in 
electricity demand was 6.3%. However, power generation capacity has still grown strongly. 
Total installed capacity increased from 970 GW in 2010 to 1,530 GW in 2015, with an annual 
growth rate of 9.5%. In particular, renewable energy sources such as wind and solar have 
shown quick expansion. Installed capacity of solar power increased from 0.3 GW in 2010 to 
42 GW in 2015 with an average annual growth rate of 169%; wind capacity had quadrupled 
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with an annual growth rate of 34% (from 30 GW to 131 GW). On the other hand, thermal 
power capacity (including coal, oil and gas, but mostly coal) had also increased from 710 GW 
to 993 GW with an annual growth rate of 6.9% [19]. Although coal still dominate the power 
system, the share of low-carbon energy sources in China’s power mix had been increasing 
significantly in the 12th five-year period. 
 
Stepping into the latest five year period, the 13th  Five Year Plan on Electricity System 
Development was announced by the National Development and Reform Commission and the 
National Energy Administration (NEA) in November 2016 [19]. It is the first national five-
year plan on electricity system in the past 15 years, although broader energy five-year plans 
are available every five years. Akin to other five-year plans, the document identifies medium-
term binding or indicative targets and specifies measures to monitor the progress. Given the 
circumstances in China’s power industry, the Plan delivers several main messages3:  
 
1) Related to coal-fired power generation, the plan states that the government ‘strives to 
control the total coal capacity within 1,100 GW by 2020’. This is due to the fast expansion 
of coal capacity in the last couple of years that contribute to over-capacity. The plan also 
refers to the closure of 20 GW of inefficient coal power plants between 2016 and 2020, 
which is very little by comparison to what is proposed to be built4. Furthermore, the target 
of coal consumption per unit of power generation is lowered to 310 grams/kWh for existing 
coal power plants and 300 grams/kWh for newly built plants;  
2) The total demand is projected between 6,800 and 7,200 TWh in 2020, which is based on a 
projected annual power demand growth between 3.6% and 4.8%. The last few years have 
seen significant deceleration in demand growth. According to the IEA [20], the annual 
growth rates between 2000 and 2010 was above 12%, comparing to 6% between 2010 and 
2016 (it was even slower between 2014 and 2016 at about 3.5% on average).  
3) The plan reveals generating capacity targets by 2020. Apart from the capacity target for 
coal, China plans to expand its power generation capacity with 110 GW of gas power, 340 
GW of hydropower, 210 GW of wind power, 110 GW of solar power and 58 GW of nuclear 
power. Total non-fossil fuel capacity is expected to reach 770 GW, an increase of 250 GW 
from 2015. It shows that China is moving away from fossil fuels and transitioning into 
renewable energy and other low carbon technologies. This clearly will lead to a reduction 
in carbon intensity per unit of power generation. 
 
Besides, China also announced policies on controlling emissions from electricity generation. 
In December 2017, China launched its carbon emission trading scheme at national level. At 
the initial stage, emission quotas are limited only to power generation sector since the sector 
                                                 
 
3 We introduce the key points in the Plan that are relevant to this study only. There are also many other important 
messages in the Plan, such as power system reform.  
4 Approximately 200 GW of new coal power capacity is proposed between 2016 and 2020 (from around 900 GW 
to 1,100 GW). 
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has the largest amount of CO2 emissions and relatively complete emission data. Over 1,700 
power generating companies are included, each of which have emissions over 26 thousand 
tonnes of CO2 equivalent emissions [21]. Similar to other carbon markets, policy makers set 
emission target levels and allocate carbon credits accordingly. Carbon credits can be purchased 
on carbon market from companies that have surplus credits when they emit less. Companies 
with higher emission levels will see increasing costs thus lower competitiveness. Therefore, 
the establishment of carbon market should have limited impacts on power supply but can 
encourage the improvement of efficiency [22]. Moreover, the State Council [11] also issued 
the 13th Five Year Plan on Controlling Greenhouse Gas Emissions in October 2016. It states 
that ‘all major power generating companies need to control their electricity supply emission 
levels at 550 g/kWh.’ The target seems very ambitious, given the existing circumstances in 
China’s power generation.  
 
At sub-national level, several provinces have shown their 13th Five-Year Plans on Energy 
Development (electricity-specific plan is rarely seen at provincial level; the Energy 
Development Plans instead covers a wide-range of electricity issues). Similar to national 
development plan, provincial development plans review the achievements in the previous five 
years, highlight development pathways in the next five years and specify measures to monitor 
the process. Given the large divergence in terms of economic development, resource 
endowments and energy consumption, provincial energy plans address the needs of domestic 
energy supply, which are largely different from one province to the other. For example, coastal 
areas are usually constrained by increasing air pollution thus addressing the needs of reducing 
coal power generation and encouraging the development of other energy sources. Interior 
regions, which are abundant in power supply, address the needs of developing transmission 
networks in order to export excessive electricity production to other provinces.  
 
Nevertheless, all provincial energy development plans pursue wider electrification of the 
energy system. This includes the development of electric vehicle industry [23], the replacement 
of fossil fuel boilers with electric heaters and on the increased use of ICT equipment which has 
the potential to increase end user consumption [24, 25]. China is the largest electric vehicle 
market in 2016, which accounts for over 40% of the global electric vehicle sales [20]. The sales 
include 350,000 electric passenger vehicles and 35,000 electric buses. Provincial policies 
highlight the importance of electric vehicle in the transportation system during the 13th five-
year period. For example, Zhejiang introduces the 13th Five Year Plan on EV and Charging 
Pile Development aiming at satisfying the need of charging 230,000 EVs by 2020. Beijing 
plans to upgrade charging infrastructure that can satisfy the electricity charging needs for 
600,000 EVs by 2020, in the Beijing Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure Special Plan. 
 
3. Data and research method 
3.1 Research Method 
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Traditionally, carbon intensity of electricity generation is measured by summing GHG 
emissions resulted from the combustion of all energy sources (mostly fossil fuels, except 
biomass). Parameters such as net calorific value, carbon content and carbon oxidation factor 
are used to estimate total CO2 emissions from fuel combustion. For each energy source, there 
are usually more than 20 different fossil fuels covered in the estimation, depending on the 
database. Main categories include coal, oil and natural gas, which is split into sub-groups, such 
as raw coal, briquettes, liquefied natural gas and so on. Given the detailed data covered, it is 
difficult to project the consumption of all energy sources for power generation in the future.  
 
In a previous study, Shearer et al. [26] estimate the annual emissions from coal power 
generation in India. Different from the approach above, the study estimate emissions through 
proposed/planned capacity in the future. Coal power capacity at different stage of development 
are collected (e.g. pre-permit, permitted, and under construction). Operating hours (represented 
by capacity factor) are adapted by using historical published data. Emissions per unit of power 
generation is calculated by multiplying heat rate (in BTU per kWh) with emission factor (in 
pounds of CO2 per BTU) and a coefficient (to convert pounds of CO2 to metric tonnes). 
However, similar to the approach above, this approach only takes into account direct emissions 
from the combustion of fossil fuels. Though direct emission accounts for a significant 
proportion of the total emissions, it does not capture upstream emissions (such as emissions 
related to coal mining and washing, plant construction, wind turbine manufacture, and solar 
panel manufacture) nor end-of-life emissions (i.e. emissions with regards to equipment 
disposal), which are not negligible.  
 
In this study, we extend the method by Shearer and colleagues to estimate future carbon 
intensity of power generation from the life cycle perspective. In doing so, we focus on 
electricity generation only excluding activities designated for heat production. 
 
For total life cycle GHG emissions from power generation in province j represented by 𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗, it 
can be calculated as 
 
𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗 =  �𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 
Where: 
𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗
𝑖𝑖  is the total generating capacity of energy type i in province j (in MW) 
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑗𝑗
𝑖𝑖  is the estimated annual operating hours of energy type i in province j (in hours) 
𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗
𝑖𝑖 is the life cycle GHG emission factor of energy type i in province j (in CO2-e grams/kWh) 
 
For total power generation in province j, represented by 𝐺𝐺𝑗𝑗 
 
𝐺𝐺𝑗𝑗 =  �𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖  
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The carbon intensity of power generation in province j (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗) is then calculated as total life cycle 
GHG emissions from different power generation sources divided by the total power generation 
in each province as 
 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 =  𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗𝐺𝐺𝑗𝑗 
 
3.2 Data source 
3.2.1 Generating capacity at provincial level in 2020 
We compile data for power generation capacity at provincial level from different sources. The 
most important sources are the Thirteenth Five Year Energy Development Plans for each 
province. One of the main components of the provincial energy plans is to specify the capacity 
targets for power generation in the next five years, based on projected economic growth during 
the same period. Capacity targets are usually indicative, which means provincial governments 
do not bound to fulfil the targets. However, the targets can roughly represent the capacity level 
that will be constructed in the next five years. Not all energy sources are covered in the plans, 
depending on the provincial context. For example, some provinces around the coastal areas 
cover the development target for nuclear power (such as Fujian and Zhejiang). Other provinces 
in the western and central areas highlight the capacity targets for hydropower (such as Sichuan 
and Yunnan). Renewable energy capacity targets are most frequently addressed in provincial 
energy plans. For example, Hebei, Shanxi and Inner Mongolia provinces each propose to have 
12 GW of additional solar power capacity installed by 2020. For wind power, Inner Mongolia 
plans to add 27 GW of installed capacity, which is followed by Xinjiang (18 GW) and Hebei 
(18 GW). The targets together with supporting policies (such as the technology-specific feed-
in-tariffs) are considered as the driving force of capacity growth, especially for renewable 
energy sources [20]. 
 
At the same time, we incorporate other data sources to complement the missing data in 
provinces which do not have relevant development plans. For example, for coal power, we use 
data from Endcoal [27] which lists the provincial coal power capacity under construction by 
July 2017. For nuclear power, we incorporate data from the World Nuclear Organization. It 
shows nuclear power plants that are due to become operational by 2020. For wind and solar 
power, we use the information from the national 13th Five Year Development Plan for Wind 
Power and Solar Power, respectively [28]. These plans listed project generation capacity in 
each province. However, in some cases, the numbers do not coincide with the provincial 
development plans. We keep data from provincial plans since the energy governance has been 
kept mostly under the supervision of provincial authorities, which should be closer to reality. 
The aggregated power generation capacity at provincial level is close to the national plan (see 
Table 1).  
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Table 1: A comparison of projected power generation capacity by 2020 (in GW) 
 
Hydro Coal Natural Gas Nuclear Wind Solar Others Total 
National 13th 
Five-Year Plan 
340 1,100 110 59 210 110 71 2,000 
Our estimation 359 1,026 110 51 244 157 19 1,965 
Source: Own calculation, data from [19, 27, 28] and various provincial energy development plans 
In general, our estimation is in line with the development targets in the 13th Five-Year Plan, 
with total installed capacity reaching 1,965 GW comparing to the projected 2,000 GW. Coal 
capacity shows the largest difference. In our case, the 1,026 GW capacity is derived from the 
existing coal capacity in operation in addition to capacities under construction, as was given 
by Endcoal [27]. At the end of July 2017, the total capacity of coal power plants (larger than 
30 MW) in operation and under construction amounts to 915 GW5 and 147 GW, respectively. 
Given that the lead time of a coal power station construction is usually three to four years, we 
project that three-fourths of these capacities will be completed and become operational by 
2020. For hydropower, the major difference comes from the accounting of pumped hydropower 
plants. At the end of 2015, total pumped hydro capacity was 23 GW, which is projected to 
reach 40 GW by 2020, an addition of 17 GW. However, pumped hydro plants are included in 
the accounting of hydropower capacity in the Electric Statistical Yearbooks and are not readily 
separated from the main category since detailed pumped hydro capacities at provincial level 
are not available. Therefore, hydropower capacity in our estimation also includes pumped 
hydro. This has resulted in a lower figure in the ‘Others’ category. Furthermore, our estimation 
shows larger capacity for renewable energy sources such as wind and solar. In fact, the growth 
of renewable energy capacity largely exceeds the planned capacity. For example, solar PV 
capacity in 2016 reached 77 GW with another 24.4 GW being installed in the first half of 2017 
[20], which made the total capacity reached over 100 GW. Therefore, the 110 GW target in the 
13th five-year plan is very conservative. The same also applies to wind power capacity. Our 
estimation takes into account provincial development plans, which usually capture the 
provincial status quo better. Due to data availability, we do not consider Tibet in our estimation. 
Table S1 in Appendix gives the details of generation capacities for all power generation 
technologies in all provinces between 2011 and 2015. 
 
3.2.2 Operating hours for different power generation technologies  
Capacity data is converted to power generation by using the operating hours of each type of 
power generation technologies from each province. Operating hours is usually known as 
capacity factor which represents the ratio of actual electricity output over a given period to the 
maximum possible electricity output during that period. The full operation factor is based on 
                                                 
 
5 The figure is different from statistics from the statistics from the NEA [30]. It shows a total capacity of 943 GW 
by the end of 2016. In order to make the numbers consistent (for plants in operation and under construction), we 
use the numbers from Endcoal to represent the coal fleet in China. To the best of our knowledge, no other source 
provides figures on coal plants under construction in China’s provinces.  
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the total hours in each year (8,760 hours). For example, if the capacity factor of a power plant 
is 40%, it means the operating hours of this power plant is 3504 hours (8760*40%). In a 
liberalised electricity market, capacity factor of a power plant depends on economic reasons 
(cost of generation), availability of the plant (equipment failure or maintenance) and resource 
availability (especially for renewable energy sources). Baseload plants, such as nuclear and 
coal, usually operate continuously at a certain level of output due to technical configuration 
and economic consideration (e.g. the energy penalty of quick ramping up and down). Natural 
gas plants are often used to provide ancillary services, therefore has lower level of capacity 
factor. Renewable energy sources outputs are variable subject to availability of wind and 
sunshine. Nevertheless, they are much lower than that of the baseload plants. 
  
We calculate the operating hours for each power generation technology in each province 
between 2011 and 2015, by using the total power generation divided by the total installed 
capacity of each technology. There are large variations for different power generation 
technologies. We justify the choice of operating hours for each power generation technology 
as following.  
 
Operating hours for coal power stations show declining trend since 2011. In 2015, the average 
operating hours were 4,207 hours, which represents a decline of 869 hours since 20116. This 
is due to lower demand growth and development of other low carbon capacity during the 
period. However, electricity demand bounced back in 2016 and 2017, with annual growth rates 
at 5% and 6.6%, respectively [29]. It has led to a revival of coal plant operating hours to a 
similar level in 2015 (4,209 hours). Policies that address the overcapacity of coal power in the 
last couple of years have shelved or cancelled the construction of over 200 GW of coal capacity. 
The coal capacity data from Endcoal largely reflects such changes. If demand growths remain 
strong, we expect coal power to show a better performance in terms of operating hours in the 
next few years. This is to ensure sufficient power supply. For that reason, we use the average 
operating hours to estimate the total power generation for coal power. 
 
The large-scale of curtailment of renewable energy output has resulted in a low operating hours 
for renewable energy. In 2016, for example, about 17% of total wind power generation at 
national level was curtailed due to limited flexibility of local power system and limited 
transmission capabilities among provincial and regional power grids. The curtailment rate is 
particularly high in resource-rich regions. Table 2 below shows the top 4 wind turbine owners 
and their associated levels of curtailment in 2016. Gansu has the highest curtailment rate of 
43% with the third largest wind power capacity of 12.8 GW. Xinjiang has third highest 
curtailment rate of 38% with the second largest installed wind capacity of 17.8 GW in 2016. 
After years of high curtailment, the Chinese government has announced policies to rectify the 
problem. For example, the National Energy Administration issued Measures for resolving 
curtailment of hydro, wind and PV power generation in November 2017 aiming at reducing 
                                                 
 
6 All data before 2015 are based on various electric statistical yearbooks, unless specified otherwise. 
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renewable energy curtailment through improved transmission channels and development of 
more flexible sources from both supply and demand side [30]. Together with the on-going 
power market reform, one should expect the better utilization of renewable energy sources. For 
that reason, we use the maximum operating hours for renewable energy sources (wind and 
solar).  
Table 2: Top 4 wind power capacity provinces and associated curtailment rate in 2016 
Province Capacity Curtailment rate Rank 
Inner Mongolia 25.57 GW 21% (12.4 TWh) 3 
Xinjiang 17.76 GW 38% (13.7 TWh) 2 
Gansu 12.77 GW 43% (10.4 TWh) 1 
Hebei 11.88 GW 9% (2.2 TWh) 8 
Source: [31] 
 
Data for gas power is very limited. At national level, only total installed capacity and power 
generation are available. Although provincial energy development plans address the 
development of gas power, it will remain a minor contributor to the total power generation in 
these provinces with Beijing being the only exception. Beijing has phased out all its coal power 
plants since 2015. Electricity supply thereafter relies on gas and inter-provincial imports. It 
results in higher operating hours than the national average (4,459 vs 2,486 hours). Given the 
planned gas capacity in each province to total generating capacity, gas power is more likely to 
provide grid services than operating as a firm power supplier. Therefore, we use the national 
average figure to represent the operating hours for gas power in 2020. 
 
For hydropower and nuclear power, average operating hours during 2011 and 2015 are used. 
Small adjustments are made for Guangxi and Hainan for nuclear power. In 2015, average 
operating hours for Guangxi were 642 hours and 615 hours for Hainan. This is due to the 
completion of new-built power plants being close to the end of the year. In 2016, the operating 
hours increased to 7,184 and 5,775 hours, respectively. Indeed, nuclear power plants usually 
operate with full operating loads as they do not have the flexibility to switch on and off 
frequently. Therefore, we use the 2015 operating hours of nuclear power in these two provinces 
and average operating hours for other provinces. Table S2 in Appendix gives the details of 
operating hours for all power generation technologies in all provinces. 
 
In order to justify our choice of operating hours, we consider the projected electricity demand 
(between 6,800 and 7,200 TWh) by the 13th Five-Year Plan on Electricity Development as a 
benchmark to ensure our estimation on generation is in line with demand. The projected 
electricity demand was based on an assumption that the annual demand growth would be 
between 3.6% and 4.8%. Demand growth in 2016 and 2017 has outpaced the projection. In our 
calculation, the total power generation is 7,260 TWh which is slightly above the upper limit 
set in the Plan. Therefore, our estimation on total power generation is close to the total power 
demand in 2020. This research does not address the changes of demand patterns, which 
represents the changes in socioeconomic conditions. Instead, we focus on the power generation 
fleet, which have been proposed by national and provincial governments. 
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3.2.4 Life cycle greenhouse gas emission factors 
The compilation of life cycle inventory can be complex. It requires detailed data inputs at all 
the stages of a product’s life. To the best of our knowledge, only few studies address the issue 
in China at provincial level. For example, Ding et al. (2017) estimate life cycle energy 
consumption and GHG emissions from thermal power and solar power in China at provincial 
level. The study uses information on material requirements and emission coefficients from 
various sources. However, the study fails to distinguish different types of thermal power 
generation (e.g. coal, gas or oil), which have significant variations in terms of life cycle 
emissions. Another study by Feng et al. [32] estimate life-cycle CO2 emissions of 8 power 
generation technologies at national level, using a hybrid life cycle analysis7. Feng’s results 
include the emissions from process life cycle analysis as well as the wider impacts via input-
output analysis. This method has also been used in addressing the emission impacts of power 
generation in China [33, 34]. It shows that coal has significantly higher life cycle emissions 
per unit of power generation (1,230 g/kWh), comparing to renewable energy sources (such as 
46 g/kWh for wind and 76 g/kWh for solar). However, the study does not address the variations 
among China’s provinces, focusing instead on the national average figure. In fact, the energy 
structure as well as the economic structure of China’s provinces are largely different from the 
national average.  
 
In this study we use the life cycle GHG emissions of seven power generation technologies 
provided in the most recent IPCC report [35] . It includes power generation from different 
sources, including coal, gas, hydro, nuclear, wind, solar and biomass. Summarizing results 
from previous literature, the IPCC report gives the maximum, medium and minimum values 
of GHG emissions during their life cycle [see Figure 2]. Since there is no better representatives 
that can reflect the life cycle GHG emissions at provincial level, the values are used in this 
study to represent the range of expected emissions. Two main GHG are included in the 
summary, namely CO2 and CH4. Some minor changes have been made to the values in 
hydropower generation, which shows a maximum value of life cycle GHG emissions per kWh 
at over 2000. As this is a special case in Brazil, we do not consider extreme values in our study.   
 
 
                                                 
 
7 Hybrid life cycle analysis represent a combination of input-output analysis with process-based 
life cycle analysis. Process-based life cycle analysis captures the requirements of material use 
during a product’ life cycle. However, it is restricted to the defined system boundary, which is 
often incomplete. Input-output analysis cover an economic system, which can be a region, 
country or the whole world. Therefore, the combination of process-based life cycle analysis 
with input-output analysis is considered as more accurate due to a complete system boundary. 
   
 
 
 
  
13 
 
Figure 2: Emission factors for different power generation technologies at minimum, median and maximum levels 
Source: [35] 
 
4. Results  
4.1 Carbon intensity by 2020 in China’s provinces 
 
The electrification of transportation and the replacement of conventional boilers by equipment 
that is powered by electricity would require the carbon intensity of power generation to stay at 
600 grams/kWh [36]. This target makes the transition towards electrification justified with 
lower emission level comparing to conventional technologies. Indeed, given the estimation 
uncertainties, the target is better represented by a range instead of a single value, which lies 
between 500 and 700 g/kWh. Figure 2 below shows our estimation of life cycle greenhouse 
gas emissions per unit of power generation in China’s provinces and at national level.  
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Figure 3: Life cycle GHG emissions per unit of power generation in China’s provinces by 2020 
We show that China is on the trajectory to stay within the 500 – 700 target range at national 
level in 2020. The possible range of carbon intensity lies between 500 g/kWh under the 
minimum emission scenario and 661 g/kWh under the maximum emission scenario, with 
medium carbon intensity level at 574 g/kWh (the ranges are calculated based on the life cycle 
emission factors shown in Figure 2). The results are very close to the emission target set in the 
13th Five-Year Plan on Greenhouse Gas Emissions, which regulate carbon intensity of power 
generation from major power companies to stay within 550g/kWh. 
 
At provincial level, our results show that most provinces can or at least have the potential to 
stay within the range. The most influential factor in determining the carbon intensity of power 
generation in each province is the level of coal production (in terms of volume and its share of 
total production). Higher level of coal consumption in power generation leads to higher carbon 
intensity of power generation. Anhui shows the highest carbon intensity per unit of power 
generation in 2020, due to the large share of coal in its total power generation. In fact, the top 
three provinces such as Anhui, Shandong and Henan produce most of their power from coal 
(94%, 91% and 91%, respectively), therefore showing higher level of emission intensity. Given 
the resource availability in these provinces, transition to a lower carbon intensity level is not 
straightforward. Nevertheless, these provinces still have the potential to stay within the 500 – 
700 grams/kWh range if the most energy efficient coal-fired units are used (e.g. under the 
minimum emission category). In fact, new coal power plants in China are more efficient than 
those of the US and the EU. Majority of the coal-fired plants were built after the 2000s. 
Therefore, higher energy efficiency can be expected. In addition, the carbon content in China’s 
coal is lower than the international average [37], which means the combustion of same quantity 
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of coal results in lower emissions. Despite the negative impacts on energy efficiency 
concerning the lower level of operation, there is potential for these provinces to achieve a lower 
level of emission intensity. Moreover, over half of China’s provinces stay within the range and 
six of them are well below 500 g/kWh. The lowest four provinces including Hubei, Qinghai, 
Sichuan and Yunnan have abundant hydropower generation; thus, have very low level of 
carbon intensity in their power generation. 
 
4.2 Changes in emission intensity between 2015 and 2020 
 
Figure 4: Carbon intensity of power generation in 2015 and 2020 
We compare the carbon intensity at the medium level of emission intensity in different 
provinces (See Figure 4) in 2015 and 2020 and find significant variations in its trend. Most 
provinces show trends of decline in carbon intensity. For example, the carbon intensity of 
power generation is likely to decline by 65% in Hainan province (from 719 g/kWh to 437 
g/kWh), which is the largest decline among all provinces. The change is largely due to the 
growth of nuclear power and hydropower in the province. This makes the share of coal power 
in total power generation drop from 81 % in 2015 to 46% in 2020. At the same time, nuclear 
power accounts for 24% of total power generation in 2020, comparing to 2% in 2015. The 
contribution of hydropower to total power generation increase to 11%, which is followed by 
natural gas at 10%.   
 
On the other hand, eight provinces show an increasing level of CO2 emissions per kWh, 
including Jiangxi, Chongqing, Guizhou, Guangxi, Hubei, Qinghai, Sichuan and Yunnan. Half 
of these provinces still have low level of carbon intensity, even with increasing emission 
-80%
-60%
-40%
-20%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
An
hu
i
Sh
an
do
ng
He
na
n
Ti
an
jin
Sh
aa
nx
i
Sh
an
gh
ai
Jia
ng
su
Sh
an
xi
He
ilo
ng
jia
ng
Jia
ng
xi
Ni
ng
xia
He
be
i
Xi
nj
ia
ng
In
ne
r M
on
go
lia
Ch
on
gq
in
g
Jil
in
Na
tio
na
l
Gu
izh
ou
Lia
on
in
g
Zh
ej
ia
ng
Gu
an
gd
on
g
Hu
na
n
Be
iji
n
Ga
ns
u
Ha
in
an
Gu
an
gx
i
Fu
jia
n
Hu
be
i
Qi
ng
ha
i
Si
ch
ua
n
CO
2-
e
gr
am
s/
kW
h
2020 2015 changes from 2015 to 2020
   
 
 
 
  
16 
intensity. This is because of the significant hydropower generation in their power mix, which 
result in very low carbon intensity. With the possible expansion of coal fleet, these provinces 
have higher proportion of power generation from more carbon intensive energy sources. For 
example, Qinghai had 65% of electricity supplied from hydropower in 2015, which is likely to 
drop to 55% in 2020. With increasing share of coal in power generation (from 20% in 2015 to 
26% in 2020), Qinghai is likely to see an increase of 25% in its carbon intensity the largest 
increase in carbon intensity amongst all provinces. Nevertheless, the carbon intensity of power 
generation in Qinghai is still well below the 600 g/kWh benchmark, sitting at 256 g/kWh.  
 
4.3 Growth of each power generation technology between 2015 and 2020 
 
 
Figure 5: Growth of each power generation technology between 2015 and 2020 
Figure 5 shows the contribution of each power generation technology to the growth in total 
power generation in all provinces. In most provinces, coal power is still the most important 
growth contributor for power generation in 2020. It coincides with the increasing coal capacity, 
an addition of 87 GW of coal fleet from 939 GW in 2015 to 1026 GW in 2020. Several 
provinces experience decline in coal power generation, including Zhejiang, Jilin, Hainan, 
Beijing and Shanghai. The decline will be replaced by different sources at different locations. 
For example, coastal affluent areas will see the replacement by natural gas (in Beijing, 
Shanghai and Zhejiang); Hainan will see a large increase in nuclear power, while Jilin shows 
an increase in hydropower generation. Sichuan and Yunnan show significant increase in 
hydropower generation, with the expansion of hydropower capacity in these provinces. On the 
other hand, a decrease in hydropower generation is mostly due to the differences in operating 
hours in Guangxi and Guizhou. Operating hours in 2015 are higher than in previous years. In 
fact, NEA [38] shows that the operating hours dropped slightly in most provinces in 2016 (e.g. 
in Guizhou, operating hours declined from 4,012 hours in 2015 to 3,315 hours in 2016; and 
Guangxi showed a decline from 4,632 to 3,802 hours between 2015 and 2016). The high 
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hydropower operating hours in 2015 were triggered by unusually increased precipitation, 
which is not a regular phenomenon in these regions. Together with limited hydropower 
capacity addition, hydropower generation is likely to decline in these provinces. Non-hydro 
renewable energy such as wind and solar starts to contribute to the generation growth, 
noticeably in provinces such as Inner Mongolia, Hebei, and Shanxi which have ambitious wind 
and solar capacity targets. Inner Mongolia, for instance, will see the largest increase in power 
generation growth (123 TWh in total). Wind and solar together will contribute to 49% of the 
growth, which is equivalent to the growth in coal power generation.  
 
With the nuclear capacity under construction, Guangdong, Liaoning and Fujian are expected 
to see a large amount of new nuclear power generation. Nevertheless, the contribution of 
nuclear power generation to the total power generation is still small due to the large total power 
generation. Nevertheless, the overall level of emissions will remain on a growing trend, despite 
a decline in carbon intensity in most provinces.  
 
4.4 A comparison with previous studies 
Several studies address the power sector carbon intensity from different perspectives. Some 
address the total power sector emissions at provincial level. For example, Lindner et al. [39] 
compare the production and consumption-based CO2 emissions from power sector in China’s 
provinces. The study shows that a significant amount of CO2 emissions is embodied in 
electricity imports/exports among provinces. Similar results can also be found in Ma and Ge 
[40]. Inner Mongolia demonstrates 109 Mt CO2 emission reduction due to large amounts of 
electricity exports. On the other hand, Beijing shows a 60 Mt or 320% emissions increase due 
to its reliance on electricity imports. Despite the differences in total emissions, the carbon 
intensity of power production does differ substantially when power trade is considered. There 
are several reasons: firstly, it is difficult to identify power trade sources. In most cases, average 
emission factor in each province are used to represent the emission factors of power imports. 
Indeed, there is no large variations on power mix in China, with exceptions in the 
western/central China which has large-scale hydropower generation. Secondly, for the reason 
above, net exporting provinces do not show great differences, except from those which also 
import electricity from other provinces (provinces usually both import and export electricity 
for power grid operational purposes). At last, for most provinces the amount of power trade 
among provinces is small comparing to their total consumption. Beijing and Shanghai are two 
exceptions due to limited self-producing capability.  
 
To the best of our knowledge, very few studies address the future carbon intensity of power 
generation in China at provincial level. Some studies address the issue in the past. For example, 
Qu et al. [41] estimate the carbon intensity of electricity generation at provincial level in 2013. 
Comparing with our results, provincial emission factors in Qu et al.’s research is much higher 
(See Figure S1 in appendix). This is mainly due to the differences in power generation mix. 
For example, in Liaoning, coal power accounted for 84% of total power generation in 2013, 
comparing to 65% in 2020 due to the growth in nuclear power generation. In another study, 
Ou et al. [42] project the carbon intensity of power generation at national level in 2020 from a 
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life cycle perspective. The studies includes three scenarios which represent different share of 
power generation technologies in the power mix. The share of power generation in the 
business-as-usual scenario is close to our estimation (with 70% coal, 1.8% oil, 0.7% natural 
gas, 5% nuclear, 0.5% biomass, 1.9% Wind and Solar, and 20% hydro). It concludes that the 
carbon intensity of power generation will reach 917 g/kWh under the BAU scenario. The result 
is much higher than our estimation since the estimated life cycle GHG emissions for coal is 
close to 1,100 g CO2-e/kWh. The value is 20% higher than the value used in this research.  
 
5. Discussion 
The carbon intensities of power generation in most provinces are within the 500 to 700 grams 
per kWh range by 2020. This means that the process of electrification can be carbon 
competitive from the perspective of electricity generation. Nevertheless, continuous efforts are 
needed in order to fulfil the longer-term target since coal is still a major contributing factor to 
the growth of power generation in the near future. Given that the lifespan of coal-fired power 
plants is usually between 35 and 40 years, it is important to address the role of coal power 
generation in the power system sooner rather than later. There is growing consensus in the 
scientific community [43, 44] and among policy makers that achieving the central aim of the 
Paris Agreement requires an early capping and then a rapid decline in global unabated coal-
fired power generation. This implies shutting down many existing coal power plants. Robinson 
and Li [45] introduce the international experiences of phasing out coal power and discuss the 
implications to China’s coal power sector. The authors suggest several ideas that can help 
China to accelerate the phasing-out of coal power generation. These include providing long-
term credible policy signals to investors, creation of competitive electricity market mechanism, 
internalizing environmental externalities, improvement of the electricity sector governance, 
and exploring opportunities associated with the transition away from coal. One other option is 
to retrofit existing plants with carbon capture and storage (CCS) and requiring CCS or similar 
abatement on new plants. In China, the growing demand of electricity might imply the 
operation of coal power plants in the near future therefore, large-scale shutting down of coal 
power plants is not a straight-forward option. To this end, CCS will need to play a central role 
in reducing carbon intensity in China in the longer term. Given the significance of CCS in 
addressing climate change targets in China, government support is necessary to encourage 
research and development of CCS technologies, which should be implemented sooner rather 
than later. 
 
For provinces with very high level of coal power generation, coordination is key to achieve a 
longer-term target. There are always restrictions on the choice of power generation 
technologies: some are due to resource endowments; others depend on political constrains. In 
those provinces with very high proportion of electricity provided by coal, there are limited 
choices to the selection of other power generation technologies. Better coordination among 
provinces is needed to fully exploit the benefits of renewable energy development in resource-
rich regions and reduce carbon intensity of power generation in those constrained provinces.  
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Instead of a legal binding emission standard, China has been emphasizing the energy efficiency 
in coal-fired power generation. Coal consumption per unit of power generation (or power 
supply) is regulated for both existing and new coal power plants. Addressing air pollutants, the 
Large Combustion Plan Directive [46] and the Industrial Emission Directive [47] set emission 
standards for power stations in the EU. Owners of power stations can opt to comply with these 
standards or opt out, in which case the plants would have to close. By 2009, a total of 205 
power plants in 17 EU countries had opted out [48]. Nevertheless, these power plants were 
given sufficient time to make a decision which effectively ease the transition. We would 
encourage the continuous measures on energy efficiency given that coal will still be the major 
power generation source in the coming years. In addition, sufficient notice should be given in 
order to smooth the process of compliance. 
 
The improvement of the operating hours for renewable energy sources is also an important 
element. There are several different ways to promote the use of renewable energy sources in 
the competition with conventional fossil-fuel based generation. For example, carbon pricing 
can make carbon-intensive generation uncompetitive. China has announced the establishment 
of the national cap-and-trade carbon trading system on December 2017 [22]. Electricity and 
heat generation is the only industry that is covered at the initial stage under the system. It covers 
over 70% of the total emissions from the power system, which amount to more than 3,500 
million tonnes of CO2. Carbon pricing proves to be more cost-effective than subsidies to 
renewable energy sources [49]. However, the effectiveness of carbon pricing is dependent on 
the price sensitivity of the industry. It can be ineffective if the price is so low that it only has 
marginal impacts on the competitiveness of fossil-fuel based generation; it can also be 
worrisome if carbon price becomes too high and result in unwillingness of power generation 
from coal-fired plants. A successful  example is the carbon floor price in the UK, which 
accelerated the phase-out of coal power generation due to lack of competitiveness [50]. 
Therefore, a systematic review on the potential impacts of carbon pricing on coal power 
generation at provincial level is needed. Nevertheless, China should consider a boarder scope 
of emission trading system. Focusing on one particular industry may encourage the use of fossil 
fuels in other industries. For example, between 2012 and 2015, total emissions in New York 
State increased by 4% since the implementation of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative cap 
and trade programme. The programme addressed emission reduction from power sector in 
particular, which had led to a 10% emission reduction in the sector. However, emission levels 
had increased significantly in heating and transportation during the same period [51]. 
 
In addition, a liberalised electricity market can make use of competitive market mechanisms to 
support least cost dispatch, retail competition, regional power exchange and so on. Such 
market-based mechanisms can support the integration of renewable energy sources, which 
usually have close to zero marginal cost. China had started its power system reform since the 
early 2000s, though the system is still very rigid in ways that favour incumbent coal and 
discourage competition from renewables. The increasing contribution of renewables (with 
fewer curtailments) can effectively reduce carbon intensity of power generation. Certainly, 
sustainable electricity sector planning needs to consider a wider range of parameters and embed 
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effective climate change targets [52]. Domestically, there is clear trend that China is moving 
away from coal-fired based power generation to a low-carbon power generation pathway. In 
this trajectory China will reduce its power sector carbon intensity and will have significant 
impact on the global carbon and fossil fuel markets and renewable energy industry in the longer 
term. Internationally, China has been promoting the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). With the 
implementation of BRI, China will provide financial as well as technical support to the 
countries alongside the BRI in their infrastructure construction. One of the core elements in the 
BRI is the energy infrastructure. China has proposed to promote the use of advanced coal power 
technology in the region covered by the BRI [53]. However, a number of countries and 
international organizations have announced plans to move away from coal. The potential 
environmental consequences and risk of stranded assets for investors should be fully addressed 
before making final investment decisions.  
 
At last, research and development on other renewable energy enabling technologies, such as 
energy storage system, is also necessary. The development of energy storage can assist the 
growth of renewable energy and improve emissions management [54] as well as boosting the 
local economy by creating new jobs and increasing local GDP. 
6. Conclusion 
In this study, we estimate the carbon intensities of power generation in China’s provinces. We 
find that most provinces are expected to have a carbon intensity per unit of power generation 
between 500 and 700 grams/kWh in 2020, which justifies the progress of electrification from 
the power generation perspective. Coal is still a major contributor to the increasing power 
generation in most provinces. Given the global trend of phasing out coal in order to reduce 
GHG emissions, China’s provinces should consider measures that can help to reduce emissions 
from coal power generation gradually. At the same time, renewable energy sources are 
becoming increasingly important, especially in the western and northern provinces which have 
large renewable energy potentials. Renewable energy sources can help reduce the carbon 
intensity of power generation, but it has experienced significant curtailments. To increase the 
contribution of renewable energy to total power generation, it requires a better coordination 
among provinces and relevant government support.  
 
In this research, we use the emission factors from IPCC to estimate the range of emissions in 
China’s provinces. Although IPCC data is reliable, it might noy represent the status quo in 
different provinces. As was mentioned in Section 3, the use of hybrid life cycle analysis can 
capture both the upstream and downstream emissions hence have a relatively complete system 
boundary. Further research should incorporate such analysis in order to make the results more 
representative for each province.  
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Appendix  
 
Table S1 Power generating capacity in 2020  
Hydro Coal Natural 
Gas 
Nuclear Wind Solar Others Total 
National 358,697 1,025,811 109,921 51,474 205,000 156,802 18,630 1,926,335 
Beijin 980 - 9,944 - 650 1,000 350 12,924 
Tianjin 10 11,872 5,370 - 1,000 800 20 19,072 
Hebei 1,820 46,186 4,000 - 21,000 15,000 800 88,806 
Shanxi 2,500 66,448 7,000 - 16,000 12,000 500 104,448 
Inner Mongolia 2,380 82,700 - - 45,000 15,000 240 145,320 
Liaoning 2,930 31,773 - 7,652 8,000 520 790 51,665 
Jilin 6,450 16,091 900 - 5,500 2,400 1,130 32,471 
Heilongjiang 1,020 19,348 613 - 6,000 170 1,100 28,250 
Shanghai - 14,310 8,000 - 1,400 800 10 24,520 
Jiangsu 2,600 77,888 20,000 4,250 10,000 8,000 1,500 124,238 
Zhejiang 11,970 42,480 12,500 9,070 4,000 8,000 1,100 89,120 
Anhui 5,030 51,260 40 - 2,600 8,000 2,000 68,930 
Fujian 13,350 26,648 3,860 8,710 5,000 900 500 58,968 
Jiangxi 4,900 22,798 389 - 3,670 3,435 560 35,752 
Shandong 1,077 94,902 4,000 2,700 14,000 10,000 2,300 128,979 
Henan 3,990 65,385 1,357 - 6,000 2,840 1,600 81,172 
Hubei 38,600 28,725 853 - 5,000 3,500 1,000 77,678 
Hunan 15,340 22,564 3 - 6,000 2,000 360 46,267 
Guangdong 13,550 61,682 23,958 15,616 6,000 6,000 230 127,036 
Guangxi 17,250 19,999 287 2,176 3,400 1,022 350 44,484 
Hainan 1,500 3,474 1,713 1,300 650 1,250 150 10,037 
Chongqing 6,760 14,780 824 - 500 5 130 22,999 
Sichuan 83,010 13,915 1,522 - 6,000 2,500 620 107,567 
Guizhou 20,560 33,710 738 - 6,000 460 150 61,618 
Yunnan 70,000 12,835 - - 12,000 2,080 - 96,915 
Shaanxi 2,660 37,710 270 - 5,500 7,000 480 53,620 
Gansu 9,500 20,285 119 - 14,000 11,000 380 55,284 
Qinghai 11,450 4,150 198 - 2,000 10,000 - 27,798 
Ningxia 430 24,370 - - 9,000 8,000 30 41,830 
Xinjiang 5,730 57,525 1,463 - 18,000 8,620 250 91,588 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table S2 operating hours in 2020 
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Hydro Coal Natural Gas Nuclear Wind Solar Others 
National 3343.4 4617.5 2486.8 7058.7 1807.7 1055.7 1035.9 
Beijing 700.6 4464.3 4459.8 0.0 2133.3 800.0 1035.9 
Tianjin 1500.0 4954.3 2246.7 0.0 2434.8 659.6 1035.9 
Hebei 714.2 5246.2 2246.7 0.0 2077.0 734.6 1035.9 
Shanxi 1522.7 4490.0 2246.7 0.0 1936.0 1428.6 105.3 
Inner Mongolia 2129.7 4874.7 0.0 0.0 1986.0 1211.5 1035.9 
Liaoning 2078.7 4406.4 0.0 7058.7 1929.0 1000.0 1035.9 
Jilin 1963.7 3500.7 2246.7 0.0 1535.8 1492.5 1035.9 
Heilongjiang 2117.8 4126.9 2246.7 0.0 1765.3 1818.2 800.0 
Shanghai 0.0 4214.6 2246.7 0.0 2406.3 1428.6 1035.9 
Jiangsu 1145.8 5380.2 2246.7 7738.3 1980.0 976.7 1035.9 
Zhejiang 2101.5 4374.4 2246.7 7374.2 2161.0 833.3 1000.0 
Anhui 1520.7 5030.9 2246.7 0.0 2109.0 600.0 1035.9 
Fujian 3528.9 4319.6 2246.7 7058.7 2682.9 2000.0 50.0 
Jiangxi 3006.2 4581.3 2246.7 0.0 2114.0 625.0 1035.9 
Shandong 526.4 5046.6 2246.7 7058.7 1869.0 1142.9 1035.9 
Henan 2669.5 4453.3 2246.7 0.0 2200.0 759.8 1035.9 
Hubei 3631.5 4251.5 2246.7 0.0 2063.0 833.3 800.0 
Hunan 3139.4 3975.3 2246.7 0.0 2125.0 3000.0 1035.9 
Guangdong 2354.7 4463.4 2246.7 7451.8 2162.2 567.3 1035.9 
Guangxi 3561.0 4195.4 2246.7 7058.7 2365.0 888.9 1035.9 
Hainan 2700.7 5016.9 2246.7 7058.7 2120.0 1500.0 1035.9 
Chongqing 3244.0 4223.7 2246.7 0.0 2000.0 1055.7 1000.0 
Sichuan 3971.8 3347.7 2246.7 0.0 2247.0 925.9 1035.9 
Guizhou 3107.6 4549.0 2246.7 0.0 1806.0 666.7 1035.9 
Yunnan 3744.0 3061.8 0.0 0.0 2315.2 1500.0 1035.9 
Shaanxi 3080.7 4801.6 2246.7 0.0 1951.0 1428.6 0.0 
Gansu 4262.7 4096.5 2246.7 0.0 1695.6 969.5 0.0 
Qinghai 3444.3 4914.1 2246.7 0.0 1726.0 1411.3 0.0 
Ningxia 4008.9 5602.6 0.0 0.0 2009.9 1493.7 0.0 
Xinjiang 3384.8 4555.2 2246.7 0.0 1742.9 1337.0 0.0 
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Figure S1 A comparison with results from Qi et al. (2017) 
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